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Abstract
The issue of technical progress under uncertainty is nested into the debate
on vertical integration vs outsourcing, to show that, in general, the former
is preferable to the latter in terms of both expected profits and technological
eﬃciency. It is then shown that there exist (i) an optimal two part tariﬀ
where the unit price set by the upstream firm is conditional upon its R&D
eﬀort, and (ii) an optimal contract specifying the input price in terms of the
initial capabilities of the sub-contractor, whereby the industry replicates the
same performance as the vertically integrated firm as for both profits and
R&D eﬀorts.
Keywords: vertical integration, outsourcing, process innovation, uncer-
tainty
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1 Introduction
A wide debate is currently taking place concerning the convenience for firms
of making or buying intermediate goods to be used as inputs in the production
process. This issue is closely related to choice between vertical integration
and dis-integration, or, equivalently, with the opportunity of outsourcing.1
From a historical perspective, the evolution of capitalism is characterised
by diﬀerent phases, in each of which the tendencies to vertical integration or
vertical dis-integration are more or less intense. Even if we confine our at-
tention to the last decades, the economic development of industrialised coun-
tries over the period of the so-called economic boom (the Fifties and Sixties)
seemed to be characterised by high incentives towards vertical integration.
On the opposite, the Eighties witnessed a strong tendency to dis-integration,
often interpreted as a way to increase flexibility (see Tadelis, 2002, inter alia).
What is happening today, in the years of (the third wave of) “globalisation”
is not clear, and this is reflected by a large literature discussing the various
aspects of this issue over the last twenty years.
According to Grossman and Hart (1986), the failure of the internal incen-
tive system, due to an incomplete assignment of property rights within the
integrated firm, may provide an advantage for arm’s length relationships. Ad-
ditionally, the existence of a suﬃciently competitive upstream market where
firms may access intermediate inputs and raw materials at relatively low
prices may lure more and more firms to choose outsourcing, with a remark-
able bandwagon eﬀect driving this process. If this eﬀect is strong enough,
then firm idiosyncratic levels of vertical integration within a given industry
are unlikely to obtain at the equilibrium (see McLaren, 2000; Grossman and
Helpman, 2002, 2005; Antras and Helpman, 2004).
On the other hand, it is by now part of the acquired wisdom that vertical
integration can be considered as a remedy to the well known hold-up problem,
with particular reference to situations where vertically related firms must
1For an overview of the early literature on vertical integration, see Perry (1989).
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rely on incomplete contracts to trade intermediate inputs whose quality (or
performance) is unobservable and requires costly investments (Williamson,
1971; Grossman and Hart, 1986).
Several other factors may of course intervene to make the picture even
more complicate, such as technological shocks, market integration, the co-
existence of firms with diﬀerent goals, and so on. However, to sum up in
a nutshell the economists’ dominant view on the choice between making or
buying and its interplay with the global nature of the present-day economic
system, one could say that globalisation favours a process of leaning or down-
sizing of firms, since subcontracting a large number of non-core activities of
any given firm is of the essence to keep up with rivals. And yet, sound as it
may seem at first glance, this view overlooks a few stylised facts that play
a crucial role. A striking one is certainly that also core activities are out-
sourced: essential technologies are being bought on the international market,
in several sectors. E.g., European or US firms operating in the hi-fi industry
buy output stages for their products in China, with the consequence that
the final product embodies very little proprietary technology of the firm that
is selling it under her brand name. This may well appear unfair to the cus-
tomer who believes to buy Italian, whatever meaning one may attach to such
a slogan, but may ultimately have much more unpleasant consequences for
the firm herself in the long run, as she will realise, sooner or later, that she’s
no longer able to build the product, as the essential know-how has been long
lost. The same considerations seemingly apply to the European aeronautical
industry, as emphasized by Pritchard and MacPherson (2007). This trans-
lates into the following question: is it wise to trade oﬀ short- or medium-run
profit gains (provided such gains do exist) generated by outsourcing against
the long-run damage associated to the perspective of loosing essential capa-
bilities in terms of R&D and, more generally, know-how?
The present paper tackles some aspects of this issue using a stripped-down
model where, alternatively, a vertically integrated monopolist carries out all
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of its activities (R&D and the production of the final good)2 internally, or
two vertically related but independent firms carry out one activity each, with
the upstream firm taking care of R&D and selling the input (a component
or an intermediate good) to the downstream firm assembling and selling the
final good. Uncertainty enters the model in the form of either a shock on
demand or a shock on the R&D technology. In the first situation, the re-
sulting technology is more eﬃcient and expected industry profits are larger
under vertical integration than under outsourcing. Hence, the model speaks
in favour of internalising all the activities inside a single firm. In the second
scenario, R&D incentives are still higher under vertical integration, while
the comparative assessment of expected industry profits favours vertical in-
tegration only for suﬃciently low levels of the variance of the technological
shock.
Additionally, I examine the viability of three diﬀerent contractual agree-
ments designed to drive the expected industry profits and the related R&D
eﬀorts under outsourcing to the same levels they would attain under vertical
integration. The first is a classic two-part tariﬀ whereby the input is traded
at marginal cost, plus a fixed fee: it turns out that such a contract cannot
be adopted as it jeopardise the upstream firm’s R&D incentives altogether.
The second scheme modifies the first in such a way that the two part tariﬀ
indeed allows firms to replicate the performance of the vertically integrated
one, by establishing that the franchising contract must take explicitly into
account the timing of the decisions being taken by the upstream firm in terms
of R&D eﬀort and input price. To illustrate that the same outcome can be
achieved along an alternative route, the third scheme consists in specifying
contractually the input price ex ante in terms of the initial technological ca-
pabilities of the upstream firm. This is accompanied by a compensation from
2The R&D considered here is for process innovation, i.e., the investment is aimed at
reducing the production costs of the final good, taking any other specs of the latter as
given. This is admittedly a restrictive assumption. However, it can be argued that, all
else equal, a reduction of the unit cost can be perceived by the final consumer as grossly
equivalent to an increase in product quality (see Futia, 1980).
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the downstream firm to the upstream one, playing the role of a risk-sharing
agreement. I show that this solution is viable and indeed allows the two
vertically related firms to exactly replicate the expected profit performance
that a vertically integrated firm would attain.
2 The setup
Consider a single-product monopolist facing a downward sloping market de-
mand and choosing (i) the amount of final good to be supplied to the market,
and (ii) whether to carry our R&D eﬀorts in house or to resort instead to
outsourcing. The environment is aﬀected by either demand uncertainty or
technological uncertainty. Accordingly, one may examine four possible cases:
I. All activities are carried out in house and uncertainty aﬀects market de-
mand. If so, the latter takes the form p = a−q/θ, where p is the market
price of the final good, a is the reservation price, q is the amount of
production (or equivalently, sales) and θ is a shock on the slope of the
demand function, with E (θ) = 1 and E
¡
θ2
¢
= σ2. Accordingly, one
has E (1/θ) = s > 1 by Jensen’s inequality.3 Producing the final output
entails a cost C (q) = zq,4 where marginal cost z decreases according
to an R&D technology represented by z = z0 − k, k being the R&D
eﬀort, whose cost is Γ (k) = bk2, b > 0. Hence, the objective of the firm
is to maximise the following expected profits:
EπH = E [(p− z) q]− bk2
w.r.t. quantity q and the intensity of the R&D investment k. Subscript
H stands for in house.
3Alternatively, one could consider an additive shock whereby p = a−q−ε, with E (ε) =
0 and E
¡
ε2
¢
= ω2. However, in such a case the optimal output would be deterministic
and uncertainty wouldn’t aﬀect the optimal behaviour of the firm (for additional aspects
of this issue, see Klemperer and Meyer, 1986). See also Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972).
4Throughout the paper, fixed costs are assumed away as they are immaterial to the
ensuing analysis.
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II. The type of uncertainty is the same as in the previous case but the firm
resorts to outsourcing. That is, she receives the component (or a generic
intermediate good) from an independent upstream firm that also carries
out the R&D eﬀort. Assume for simplicity that the production of one
unit of the final good requires one unit of the outsourced intermediate
good or component, which is traded at a unit price c chosen by the
OEM firm. Define the latter as the upstream (U) firm, and the unit
selling the final good as the downstream (D) firm. This has to choose
quantity q to maximise expected profits
EπD = E [(p− c) q]
while the upstream firm chooses c and k to maximise
EπU = E [(c− z) q]− bk2.
This is a Stackelberg (i.e., sequential play) game with firm u moving
first and firm D moving second, to be solved by backward induction so
as to characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium.
III. In the alternative case, uncertainty aﬀects the outcome of the R&D
investment. The integrated firm carrying out innovation in house has
a technology z = z0− k+ ε, with E (ε) = 0 and E (ε2) = ω2, while the
demand function is deterministic: p = a−q. Therefore, the monopolist
has to set q and k to maximise EπH = E [(p− z) q − bk2] .
IV. The last setup is the variant of III, with the downstream monopolist
opting for outsourcing, with EπD = E [(p− c) q] . The upstream OEM
firm sets k to maximise EπU = E [(c− z) q − bk2] .
3 In house R&D with demand shocks
The monopolist’s expected profit function writes as follows:
EπH = E
h³
a− q
θ
− z0 + k
´
q
i
− bk2.
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The associated first order conditions (FOCs) are
∂EπH
∂q
= a+ k − 2sq − z0 = 0
∂EπH
∂k
= q − 2bk = 0
since E (1/θ) = s, whereby
Eq∗ =
a+ k − z0
2s
and
Ek∗ =
a− z0
4bs− 1 > 0
for bs > 1/4.5 The expected equilibrium profits are
Eπ∗H =
b (a− z0)2
4bs− 1
while the eﬃciency level of the firm is measured by the equilibrium marginal
cost Ez∗H = (a− 4bsz0) / (1− 4bs) . Note that, in view of the constraint
bs > 1/4, Ez∗H > 0 iﬀ a > 1/4 and bs ∈ (1/4, a) .
The associated expected levels of consumer surplus and social welfare are:
ECS∗H =
2b2 (a− z0)2
(4bs− 1)2
ESW ∗H ≡ ECS∗H +Eπ∗H =
b [2b (1 + 2s)− 1] (a− z0)2
(4bs− 1)2
which are clearly positive over the admissible parameter range specified
above.
5This condition, ensuring the existence of an interior solution, also ensures stability
and concavity. The detailed analysis of these aspects of the model are omitted for brevity.
Note, however, that I will intentionally put aside the boundary solution Ek∗ = 0 arising
for all bs ≤ 1/4 as this entails that the industry generates no technical progress at all.
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4 Outsourcing with demand shocks
Now suppose the firm selling the final good decides to buy the component
from an upstream supplier who also takes care of investing in process inno-
vation. Solving the game by backward induction, the expected value of the
output of firm D is the outcome of the following problem:
max
q
EπD = E
h³
a− q
θ
− c
´
q
i
yielding
∂EπD
∂q
= a− c− 2sq = 0⇔ Eq∗ = a− c
2s
which must be plugged into the problem of firm U :
max
c,k
EπU = E [(c− z) q∗]− bk2 =
(a− c) (c+ k − z0)
2s
− bk2.
This produces the FOCs:
∂EπU
∂c
=
a− 2c− k + z0
2s
= 0
∂EπU
∂k
=
a− c− 4bsk
2s
= 0
whose solution is the pair of optimal strategies:
Ec∗U =
a− k∗ + z0
2
Ek∗U =
a− z0
8bs− 1
so that equilibrium output, marginal cost and profits are
Eq∗D =
2b (a− z0)
8bs− 1 ;Ez
∗
U =
a− 8bsz0
1− 8bs
Eπ∗U =
b (a− z0)2
8bs− 1 ;Eπ
∗
D =
4b2 (a− z0)2 s
(8bs− 1)2
Provided a > 1/8, The interior solution is viable for all bs ∈ (1/8, a) .
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The corresponding expected consumer surplus and social welfare are:
ECS∗UD =
2b2 (a− z0)2
(8bs− 1)2
ESW ∗UD ≡ ECS∗UD +Eπ∗U +Eπ∗D =
b [2b (1 + 6s)− 1] (a− z0)2
(8bs− 1)2
.
5 Make or buy with demand shocks
Given the constraint ensuring the existence of an interior solution, the two
cases outlined above are both admissible for bs ∈ (1/4, a) provided a > 1/4.
A quick inspection of the foregoing analysis allows to state:
Proposition 1 Suppose a > 1/4 and bs ∈ (1/4, a) . If so, then (i) Ez∗U >
Ez∗H; (ii) Eπ
∗
H > Eπ
∗
U + Eπ
∗
D; and (iii) ECS
∗
H > ECS
∗
UD over the entire
admissible parameter range.
That is, in the region of parameters where both interior solutions ex-
ist, investing in house is preferable to outsourcing in terms of both the re-
sulting level of technological eﬃciency and industry profits. A fortiori, the
firm supplying the final good should prefer carrying out R&D internally as
Eπ∗H > Eπ
∗
D. The explanation is to be found in the double marginalisation
characterising the outsourcing solution, which (i) distorts the distribution of
surplus along the vertical channel, all else equal, and (ii) as a result, lowers
firm U ’s incentive to innovate as compared to what the integrated firm would
find it optimal: indeed Ek∗H > Ek
∗
U . Note that, as a result of the absence
of double marginalisation, the quantity becomes larger, Eq∗H > Eq
∗
D. Over-
all, vertical integration entails a lower marginal cost because of higher R&D
investments and consequently a larger output at a lower market price. The
balance of these eﬀects produces a profit increase. In view of the current
debate on outsourcing in a global economy, this setup illustrates a situation
where vertical integration dominates outsourcing in all respects. To com-
plete the picture, Eq∗H > Eq
∗
D implies ECS
∗
H > ECS
∗
UD (and therefore also
ESW ∗H > ESW
∗
UD).
8
6 In house R&D with technological shocks
Examine the setup where the shock aﬀects the R&D activity. The integrated
firm wants to maximise
EπH = E
£
(a− q − z) q − bk2
¤
w.r.t. q and k, s.t. the technological constraint z = z0 − k + ε. The FOCs
are:
∂EπH
∂q
= a+ k − 2q − z0 = 0
∂EπH
∂k
= q − 2bk = 0
yielding
Eq∗H =
2b (a− z0)
4b− 1 ;Ek
∗
H =
a− z0
4b− 1;Ez
∗
H =
a− 4bz0
1− 4b
and
Eπ∗H =
b (a− z0)2
4b− 1 .
Expected consumer surplus and welfare are
ECS∗H =
2b2 (a− z0)2
(4b− 1)2
ESW ∗H ≡ ECS∗H +Eπ∗H =
b (6b− 1) (a− z0)2
(4b− 1)2
.
This solution is acceptable if b > 1/4 and z0 > a/ (4b) .
7 Outsourcing with technological shocks
Here an independent upstream firm works out the intermediate good and
the related R&D activity, while the downstream firm chooses the output
level only. By backward induction, we start by considering the problem of
firm D :
max
q
EπD = E [(a− q − c) q]⇔ Eq∗D =
a− c
2
.
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The expression Eq∗D can be plugged into firm U ’s expected profit function:
EπU = E [(c− z)Eq∗D]− bk2 =
(a− c) (c+ k − z0)
2
− bk2,
the FOCs w.r.t. c and k being:
∂EπU
∂c
=
a− 2c− k + z0
2
= 0
∂EπU
∂k
=
a− c− 4bk
2
= 0
whose solution is
Ec∗U =
a− k∗ + z0
2
Ek∗U =
a− z0
8b− 1
The resulting expected equilibrium profits are
Eπ∗U =
8b
£
(a− z0)2 + ω2
¤
− ω2
8 (8b− 1) ;Eπ
∗
D =
16b
£
4b
¡
(a− z0)2 + ω2
¢
− ω2
¤
+ ω2
16 (8b− 1)2
both strictly positive for any level of the variance ω2, with
Eq∗D =
2b (a− z0)
8b− 1 ;Ez
∗
U =
a− 8bz0
1− 8b .
As for expected consumer surplus and social welfare, we have:
ECS∗UD =
16b
£
4b
¡
(a− z0)2 + ω2
¢
− ω2
¤
+ ω2
32 (8b− 1)2
ESW ∗UD ≡ ECS∗UD+Eπ∗U +Eπ∗D =
32b (14b− 1) (a− z0)2 + 7 (8b− 1)2 ω2
32 (8b− 1)2
.
This equilibrium is admissible over the entire parameter region wherein the
vertically integrated problem admits an internal solution.
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8 Make or buy with technological shocks
Comparing Ez∗U and Ez
∗
H for b > 1/4, one immediately verifies:
Proposition 2 In the parameter range where interior solutions exist, Ez∗U >
Ez∗H .
The comparative assessment of expected industry profits depends instead
on the variance of the shock:
Lemma 3 Eπ∗H > Eπ
∗
U +Eπ
∗
D for all
ω2 ∈
Ã
0,
256b3 (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)
!
and conversely for any ω2 outside such a range.
Similarly, as for expected consumer surplus and social welfare, we have:
Lemma 4 ECS∗H > ECS
∗
UD for all
ω2 ∈
Ã
0,
512b3 (6b− 1) (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)2
!
while ESW ∗H > ESW
∗
UD for all
ω2 ∈
Ã
0,
1024b3 (5b− 1) (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)2
!
and conversely.
Given that
512b3 (6b− 1) (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)2
>
1024b3 (5b− 1) (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)2
>
256b3 (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)
in the region where b > 1/4, Lemmata 3-4 yield
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Proposition 5 For all
ω2 ∈
Ã
0,
512b3 (6b− 1) (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)2
!
private (profits) and social incentives are aligned in favouring vertical inte-
gration. In the intermediate range
ω2 ∈
Ã
512b3 (6b− 1) (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)2
,
1024b3 (5b− 1) (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)2
!
vertical integration is socially eﬃcient but outsourcing is more profitable.
Finally, for all
ω2 ∈
Ã
1024b3 (5b− 1) (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)2
,
512b3 (6b− 1) (a− z0)2
3 (8b− 1)2 (4b− 1)2
!
outsourcing is both socially and privately convenient.
Note that in the second of the ranges considered in Proposition 5, verti-
cal integration is socially preferable due to its beneficial eﬀects on consumer
surplus, that more than compensate the profit loss. Conversely, in the third,
the profit loss suﬀered from the firm outweighs the gain still characteris-
ing consumer surplus, and therefore a social planner would be led to prefer
outsourcing to vertical integration notwithstanding the eﬀects on consumer
surplus. Of course if the variance of the shock ends up being above the
highest threshold, then also consumers prefer outsourcing.
9 Two-part tariﬀ vs contractible input price
The remaining open question is whether the outsourcing solution can be
corrected via a two-part tariﬀ according to which firm D buys q units of the
intermediate good or input from firm U by paying a total amount equal to
T = cq + f, where c and f are to be contracted upon in such a way that (i)
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the expected profit performance of the entire vertical channel (or industry)
exactly replicates those of the vertically integrated monopolist, and (ii) the
R&D eﬀort (and therefore also the quality of the intermediate good) is the
same as in the vertically integrated case.
Irrespective of the type of shock being considered, we may examine the
standard perspective where c = z and f = Eπ∗H − β, with β ∈ [0, Eπ∗H) ,
exogenous to the model. That is, firm D pays the input at marginal cost,
plus an additional fixed fee which is at most equal to the expected profit
generated by the in house solution (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988, ch. 4; Katz, 1989;
and Martin, 2001).
Consider first the case of a demand shock. The downstream firm chooses
the output level to maximise
EπD = E
h³
a− q
θ
− z
´
q
i
−Eπ∗H + β
yielding Eq∗ = (a− z) / (2s) . Going backward to firm U ’s problem, imposing
c = z obviously implies that the expected gross profits from selling the input
to firm D drop to zero, the resulting expression being:
EπU = f − bk2 = Eπ∗H − β − bk2.
Clearly, the above profits are everywhere decreasing in k, which suﬃces to
prove that the proposed two-part tariﬀ cannot reproduce the profit perfor-
mance and the R&D incentives of the vertically integrated firm. The same
of course applies to the alternative case where the shock appears in the R&D
technology, as the essence of the problem is not the placement of the shock
but the impossibility of aligning the upstream firm’s incentives towards in-
novation. Indeed, it is very easy to verify that the argument goes through
unmodified in the fully deterministic setup. Hence:
Proposition 6 The two-part tariﬀ T = cq+f cannot replicate the vertically
integrated solution if the latter admits positive R&D investments.
Obviously, the two-part tariﬀ would work in case the corner solution pre-
vailed under vertical integration, as the optimal amount of R&D would be
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zero in either case. However, this is a situation where there is no incen-
tive whatsoever to generate technical progress and therefore, per se, a less
interesting one.6
To get around this problem, one may consider the following perspective:
instead of setting c = z from the outset, just take z = z0 − k for any c. This
entails that the upstream objective function becomes:
EπU = E [(c− z0 − k) q∗] +Eπ∗H − β − bk2 (1)
yielding the FOC:
∂EπU
∂k
=
a− c− 4bk
2
= 0 (2)
whose solution w.r.t. k coincides with the optimal in house R&D eﬀort Ek∗H ,
once c has been set equal to z = z0 − k in (2). Accordingly, also the profit
performance of the channel exactly replicates that of the vertically integrated
firm. This is summarised by:
Proposition 7 The optimal franchising contract indeed entails marginal cost
pricing by the upstream firm, provided that the unit price be equal to the ef-
fective marginal cost characterising firm U once the latter has carried out its
R&D eﬀort.
What the above Proposition tells is that whether the pricing rule c = z
is set before or after writing the necessary condition (2) does make a crucial
diﬀerence. So much for the mathematical structure of the model; its intuitive
counterpart is that the contract must specify that ”the unit price will be set
at marginal cost conditional upon the completion of the R&D activity by the
upstream firm”. What is of the essence here is the timing associated with
the two decisions that the upstream firm has to take (and which the contract
must spell out explicitly) in order to replicate the performance attainable
6The feasibility of two-part tariﬀs has been investigated in a similar environment in
the marketing literature, where the issue is investing in advertising rather than in R&D.
See Jeuland and Shugan (1983) for a static approach, and Zaccour (2008) for a dynamic
approach to this problem.
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under vertical integration. Realistically, a sound interpretation of events is
that firm U first carries out the R&D project and then sets the price at the
resulting marginal cost. If the franchising contract properly accounts for this
proviso, then joint profits will indeed be maximised.
An alternative (and not equivalent) approach consists in making the input
price c contractible and set it ex ante so as to reproduce the performance of
the vertically integrated monopolist whenever it is desirable to do so.7 To see
how this works, take again the first model, with demand uncertainty. The
problem of the upstream firm is now to maximise
max
k
EπU =
(a− c) (c+ k − z0)
2s
− bk2
with c being negotiated upon so as to attain the same overall expected profits
for the vertical channel as the integrated monopolist. The optimal investment
is
Ek∗U (c) =
a− c
4bs
so that the sum of the two firms’ expected profits is
Eπ∗U (c) +Eπ
∗
D (c) =
(a− c) [a+ c (8bs− 1)− 8bsz0]
16bs2
+
(a− c)2
4s
.
Then, imposing
Eπ∗U (c) +Eπ
∗
D (c) = Eπ
∗
H =
b (a− z0)2
4bs− 1
yields the optimal (negotiated) input price
cU =
a− 4bsz0
1− 4bs
which ensures not only the replication of the profit performance of the verti-
cally integrated firm, but also the exact replication of the R&D eﬀort asso-
ciated to it, since it turns out that Ek∗U (cU) = (a− z0) / (4bs− 1) .
7Recall that under technological uncertainty the vertically integrated solution is desir-
able only for suﬃciently low levels of the shock variance.
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There remains to observe the resulting distribution of profits along the
vertical channel is not the same as in the previous solution, although the
overall channel profits are of course the same. The upstream firm’s expected
profits are:
Eπ∗U (cU) = −
b (a− z0)2
(4bs− 1)2
< 0
that is, the upstream firm is loosing money in correspondence of the solution
(cU , k∗U (cU)) , precisely because she’s undertaking a risky R&D project
8 with
the stipulated objective of fully replicating the same optimal innovation as if
she were the upstream division of a vertically integrated unit. Also, note that
cU = z∗H , i.e., the input is indeed traded at marginal cost. This seemingly
coincides with what would happen in case the two-part tariﬀ were adopted,
with a crucial diﬀerence: while the two-part tariﬀ would establish c = z
a priori (for a generic level of c) and therefore would jeopardize firm U ’s
innovation incentives, the contract envisaged here stipulates that c = cU
which in turn is a function of the initial level of technological capabilities of
firm U as measured by z0, not z. It goes without saying that the contract
between U and D must also account for a compensation scheme (in the
form of a side payment from D to U) compensating the upstream firm and
ultimately ensuring that her expected profits be non-negative.
The alternative case where the shock enters the R&D technology lends
itself to a largely analogous treatment. Firm U has to
max
k
EπU =
(a− c) (c+ k − z0)
2
− bk2
for a given level of c. This yields the certainty-equivalent R&D eﬀortEk∗U (c) =
(a− c) / (4b) . Next, one has to solve Eπ∗U (c)+Eπ∗D (c) = Eπ∗H to obtain the
optimal (negotiated) input price
cU =
a− 4bz0
1− 4b .
8Although the shock aﬀects in principle the demand function, it is nonetheless true
that it exerts a tangible eﬀect on the R&D incentive, as demonstrated by the expression
of k∗U (cU ) , which depends on s.
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Once again, the expected profit of firm U,
Eπ∗U (cU) = −
b (a− z0)2
(4b− 1)2
is negative and therefore the contract must contemplate a compensation
scheme making up for the profit loss. In both cases, irrespective of the nature
of the shock, such a compensation scheme largely behaves as a risk-sharing
arrangement.
10 Concluding remarks and extensions
The foregoing analysis has singled out the possibility that outsourcing under-
mines the long-run technological capabilities of a firm, as well as its profits,
with the exception of the case where the R&D technology is aﬀected by a
shock whose variance be suﬃciently large.
As an alternative to vertical integration, the industry may replicate the
same profits by resorting to a franchising contract specifying the input price
(i) either in terms of the eﬀective marginal cost attained by the upstream
firm after having completed the R&D activity, or (ii) in terms of the initial
level of productive eﬃciency of the OEM unit. This must go along with a
compensation scheme rewarding the upstream firm for the risk associated
with the project.
Several extensions of the present model are possible as well as desirable,
e.g., the analysis of R&D for product innovation or the introduction of up-
stream or downstream competitors (as in Garvey and Pitchford, 1995). These
perspectives are left for future research.
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